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THE CRATYLUS: AN EXPLICATION
Elizabeth Upbam

hy do we say that when a cat "talks" it
meows? Are the letters expressive of the
true nature of a cat's voice? For that matter, why
do we call a cat a cat? Where do we get the
letters to form the words that form sentences?
These are the questions Socrates, Hermogenes,
and Cratylus attempt to answer in Plato's
dialogue. They try to discover if things are
named with consideration to phusis how the
object or idea appears in nature, or nomos, law
and convention. When the dialogue begins,
Socrates is apparently pulled off the street to
settle a rather complex argument between
Cratylus and Hermogenes and he quickly
confesses that he knows next to nothing about
language and its origins-mainly because he
couldn't afford the 50 drachma course on
grammar-but he will do his best. It does
become clear that Socrates is a little more
informed than he led the two to believe,
especially when he dissects words and names so
effortlessly.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Cratylus
drops out after one line to, "preside" over the
dialogue, almost like a judge presiding over a
court, whose favor Socrates and Hermogenes are
both trying to gain, since Hermogenes' lines: "he
has a notion of his own ... and could entirely
convince me if he chose," suggest that he holds
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all the answers. Socrates lays a groundwork for discussion
with the intention of getting to the truth. What follows is, a very
subtle ring composition with all three men ending up in
exactly the same place they started, whereas a dialogue such
as The Symposium is constructed in a way as to let the reader
know exactly what is to take place.
Socrates begins by challenging Hermogenes' view that
language is decided by convention and mutual agreement,
seemingly rejecting it, but then he seems to agree with it later
by 'pointing out that legislators, essentially men of law, are the
ones' who name things. He states that legislators are the only
ones really skilled enough to name things, much like the
weaver is the only one who can use a shuttle effectively. In
Greek, lawgiver is nomos and the word for name-giver is
onoma, so Socrates is punning on the words throughout. An
interesting coinparison can be dra~ here, since Socrates can
be compared to a lawyer in a court and then he says that
legislators are the only 'competent namers. Then Socrates starts
to talk about nature and Hermogenes eggs him on by saying
that he might be persuaded to a different view if only Socrates
would "show him what this is which you term the natural
fitness of names." Socrates once again professes his ignorance
(which becomes an inte~al part of the dialogue), but says that
he might be able to help Hennogenes with the help of Homer.
He quotes from several sections of The Iliad, (20.74, Xanthus
and Scamander; 14.291, Chalcis and Cymindis; 22.507,
Astyanax and Scamandrius), where the gods have different
names for things than mortals. These passages depict not only
a parallel war among the gods, in which the gods can be taken
to symbolize Athens, Corinth, ~nd Sparta in the beginning of
the Peloponnesian War, but also a vivid image of Hera lying to
and deceiving Zeus and using the god Sleep to drug him,
much like the way Socrates fs lying to and deceiving
Hermogenes, using his own so-called ignorance as his drug.
Socrates then goes on to discuss a little about Hesiod's golden
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race of daemons and then the flrst names of conunon people,
then the appropriateness of heroes' names (and he calls them
demi-gods later), and then finally the names of the gods,
creating a familiar pattern of ascension. When Hermogenes
praises him for his new found wisdom, Socrates credits
Euthyphro, and not the fact that he actually had some idea of
what he was talking about all along.
Hermogenes asks him after his explication of the name of
Zeus to discuss body and soul as he had just discussed the
word man. Socrates says that not only is the body the grave of
the soul, but it is the index of the soul and also the punishment
of the soul. It is interesting to note here that the topic of body
and soul marks a mid-way point for the ring composition that
later becomes more apparent. The explication of gods' names
is then taken up again, and Socrates says that maybe these are
only the names that mortals know of and perhaps the gods call
themselves differently, alluding to the quotes from Homer.
Some names are easily derived with one meaning and some
are not so easily derived and have n10re than one meaning,
such as the name Apollo. Socrates says that the name of
Apollo is, in his opinion, the most expressive of all the gods'
names, meaning not only the usual music, prophecy, and
archeIY, but also harmony and purity. When one keeps in
mind that the gods in the allusion material can symbolize the
city-states, one can assume that Socrates is using the god
Apollo to personify Athens, suggesting that the city means
everything, not only war and-in a sense-victory, but
harmony. This harmony is thoroughly praised in Book I by an
Athenian ambassador in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War.
Socrates concludes by saying that he is afraid of the gods and
tries to turn to another subject, but is easily persuaded back by
a pleading Hermogenes.
Instead of talking blatantly about the gods, as Hermogenes
would like, Socrates discusses elements and discovers that
primitive namers must have thought that everything was in
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flux, much like the then modem philosophers, and that is why
most all names have motion reflected in them. After the
discussion on such principles as ~th and justice, Hennogenes
calls him on the "improvisation" that has gone on before and
says that he is, in effect, clainling another's findings as his
own. Socrates hopes to make Hermogenes believe the
originality, as he puts it, of the rest of his discussion, and
plunges back in by once again discussing man, forming a
distinct ring composition.
Socrates starts to discuss the fact that really anybody can fit
a word into any pattern of derivation simply by inserting and
deleting letters, again comparing himself to the legislator he is
so enamored of. Hennogenes doesn't really go for this, calls it
shoddy, and Socrates tries to redeem himself by saying that no
one will know because the original words have been long
buried by added and missing letters. Socrates then concludes
this lengthy discussion on virtue by saying that "if one person
goes on analyzing names into words ... he who has to answer
him must at last give up in despair."
He then segues into a "what if' sequence where he asks
Hermogenes how people would communicate if they had no
voice or tongue; he also points out that music and art is a
representation of nature and virtue without words. Socrates
uses this image to talk about how words and letters are there
to express the true nature of an object without playing
charades or Pictionary; and he also says that words have to be
an accurate representation of an object in order to be deemed
true.
After exploring the reflection of nature in the letters
themselves (example: letters that have a hard sound are
usually present in words signifying motion) and comparing
them to the colors a painter might use, Cratylus rejoins the
dialogue as Hennogenes drops out. Socrates drills Cratylus on
names in relation to truth and falsehood, and prompdy makes
a fool out of him by making Cratylus contradict himself.
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Socrates reviews the previous conversation he had with
Hermogenes with Cratylus akin to fmal summations. Cratylus
gives his opinion that language is and should be a reflection of
nature, and Socrates appears to accept this ideal to a point
before he rejects it somewhat, like the nomos belief. He admits
that he really doesn't know one way or the other, and implores
the men to "come and tell" him the truth when they fmd it,

ending in ambiguity similar to the beginning and completing
the ring.
My conclusion is that it is Plato's intent in this dialogue to
compare Socrates to a legislator with the power to bestow
appropriate names on things, even though he hides Socrates
behind a veil of uncertainty about the true nature of names.
He drugs Hermogenes and Cratylus, like Hera, not only with
his ignorance but with his very presence, and tries to "suck"
information out of them in order to complete his own lacking
education. He is full of contradictions about his own
knowledge on the subject, saying that if he had been able to
afford the course on grammar and language he could answer
the questions of Hermogenes and Cratylus easily, but he later
suggests that SophiSts such as Protagoras really don't know
what they are talking about, leaving the reader to answer all
the unanswered questions and make up his or her own mind.
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